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The question of the essence of language: an inferentialist reading 




The paper discusses Rush Rhees’ critique of Wittgenstein, concerning the question of the essence of language. While 
Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, keeps on insisting that there is no such thing as the essence of language (PI, § 
65), Rhees, in “Wittgenstein’s Builders”, argues for the opposite: that there has to be something in language to be called its 
essence, and sees this crucial element in “discourse”, “dialogue” or “conversation”. The present analysis reveals these aspects 
of Rhees’ reflections to be parallel to Robert B. Brandom’s more recent inferentialist project. Accordingly, such semantic stances 
as essentialism, propositionalism, holism and inferentialism – characteristic of Brandom’s conception – are also ascribed to that 
of Rhees’, along with the claim that the core of language constitutes the inferentialist “game of giving and asking for reasons”. 
 
 
In § 65 of PI Wittgenstein articulated his widely known view 
that there is no such a thing as the essence of language: 
Instead of pointing out something common to all that 
we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena 
have no one thing in common in virtue of which we 
use the same word for all – but there are many differ-
ent kinds of affinity between them. And on account of 
this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “lan-
guages” (Wittgenstein 2009: 36) 
The affinity Wittgenstein speaks about here is the sort of 
similarity that can be called “family resemblances” between 
different “language games” (§ 66-67). Thus, there is no 
one specific game, or function, that would be essential for 
language, on virtue of which it can be named “language”. 
Various language games, like games in the ordinary sense 
of the word, are not covered by any common definition, nor 
do they share any joint constitutive content. Instead, they 
are connected far less strictly, being akin to each other in a 
way the family members are: they all do not have to mani-
fest one characteristic feature, but still are somehow simi-
lar to each other.  On the same basis, what we call “lan-
guage” comprises a variety of different dimensions and 
activities, none of which plays a special, essential role. In § 
18 of PI, this matter has been captured by a suggestive 
simile; Wittgenstein writes: 
Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a 
maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses, of houses with extensions from various peri-
ods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new 
suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform 
houses (Wittgenstein 2009: 22). 
As it is impossible to answer the question: “how many 
houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a 
town?” (Wittgenstein 2009: 22), it is also unworkable to 
determine which and how many games it does take before 
language begins to be a language. 
The urban analogy of § 18 can be interpreted – for ex-
ample after Harald Johanessen (Johanessen 2008: 67) – 
in the following way. The pursuit of the essence of lan-
guage resembles the search for the downtown of such an 
old city. Our quest for it could proceed gradually by dis-
carding its particular quarters, streets, parks and houses, 
in hope of discovering its true core. Similarly, the philoso-
phical pursuit of the essence of language consists in pro-
gressively tearing different language games off, as to get  
 
to such a game that is constitutive of the language and 
thus can be regarded as its essence. This would be an 
autonomous language game, possible to be played out 
while, assumingly, not playing any other. Wittgenstein’s 
answer suggests that in both cases, the city and the lan-
guage, there is no way to get to the core. 
In addition, it seems that Wittgenstein’s words ought not 
to be interpreted to mean only that an autonomous, com-
plete, essential language game does not exist; it also 
means that many various, even if primitive, language 
games are autonomous, still none constitutes the linguistic 
essence. For, at the beginning of § 18, he emphasizes: 
Don’t let it bother you that languages (2) and (8) con-
sist only of orders. If you want to say that they are 
therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own 
language is complete – whether it was so before the 
symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infini-
tesimal calculus were incorporated into it (Wittgenstein 
2009: 22). 
Some examples of such primitive but complete language 
games would be – while following Wittgenstein’s sugges-
tions – a language consisting only of imperatives (§2, §8), 
of orders and reports in battle (§ 19), or “of questions and 
expressions for answering Yes and No” (§ 19) (Wittgen-
stein 2009: 22), or even Augustinian naming language of § 
1. Yet, to repeat, the game that would constitute the real 
essence of language cannot exist. 
* 
One of the first polemics with the above Wittgenstein’s 
view was given by Rush Rhees in his “Wittgenstein’s 
Builders” (Rhees 1959), whereas his wider critical reflec-
tions from the years 1957-1960 and 1967 (mostly from 
1957, the year of Rhees working on “Wittgenstein’s Build-
ers”) was published posthumously, in 1988, by Devi Z. 
Phillips under the title Wittgenstein and the Possibility of 
Discourse in 1988 (Rhees 2006). The present analysis of 
Rhees critique will refer just to the latter. 
Rhees disagrees primarily with Wittgenstein’s alleged 
abuse of the metaphor of games in his thinking of lan-
guage, and claims that the author of PI was himself se-
duced by this picture of language, never being able to get 
out of it (Rhees 2006: 151). Therefore, he states, Wittgen-




stein regarded language as “a family of games”1 (Rhees 
2006: 116, 151). What is then wrong with such a view? 
First, the metaphor, when pushing too far, misleadingly 
suggests that „saying something”, or „understanding some-
thing”, is somehow similar to “a move in a game” – to sim-
ply our complying with some, more or less formal, rules of 
this game. Second, the picture of a family of games does 
not guarantee the unity of language, i.e. the mutual under-
standing of what we say, our capability of following con-
versation, our partaking in the same linguistic activity or 
“game”, speaking the same language. 
The matter concerning lack of analogy between playing 
a game and speaking a language Rhees encapsulates, in 
the essay “‘What is Language’”, in the following way: 
If someone learns to speak, he does not just learn to 
make sentences and utter them, nor to react to orders 
either. He learns to say something. He learns what 
can be said; he learns – however fumblingly – what it 
makes sense to say. This is an accomplishment over 
and above being able to work together. It is not just an 
addition to the technique, as you might learn to oper-
ate a new tool. And to do this, he must learn how re-
marks hang together, how they may bear on one an-
other. This is something different from learning gen-
eral rules or general principles – even though it does 
not go without that. 
And because he learns to speak, and he learns what 
can be said, he can go on speaking and go on learn-
ing (…). And the being able to go on is not like being 
able to continue a series, say, or being able to do fur-
ther multiplications. This is not the same as learning 
the meaning of particular expressions, although it is 
impossible without that (Rhees 2006: 29). 
From the above quotation one can infer that speaking a 
language assumes a sort of unity that exceeds the family 
resemblances between different language games, there-
fore language cannot be aptly described as a family of 
games. Moreover, because Rhees stresses the impor-
tance of what he calls “conversation”, or “discourse”, and 
emphasizes the fact that to say something goes closely 
with understanding what is being said, one concludes that 
according to Rhees, pace Wittgenstein, language has an 
essence: this essence is “conversation”, “discourse”. He 
states this explicitly in a passage from “Wittgenstein’s 
Builders – Recapitulation”: 
Not all discourse is conversation, but I do not think 
there would be speech or language without it. And if 
there were someone who could not carry on any con-
versation – who had no idea of answering questions 
or of making any comment – I do not think we should 
say he could speak (Rhees 2006: 161). 
Then, although Rhees is aware of many different func-
tions, or games, of language, he singles one of them out, 
the conversation, which can be regarded as a center – to 
recall Wittgenstein’s simile of PI, § 18 – which other lan-
guage games and functions are adjacent to, similarly to 
the way quarters of a city are built on its downtown. 
* 
When speaking about conversation as the essence of lan-
guage, one can go on and ask on what basis is the unity of 
                                                     
1 In fact, according to Rhees, Wittgenstein attempted to complement the con-
cept of “game” with such concepts as “customs”, “institutions” or “forms of life”, 
yet remained totally preoccupied by the metaphor of games (Rhees 2006: 
176). 
discourse, or of language, secured. And it seems that it 
can only be revealed through the analysis of the conditions 
of discourse possibility, through examining what makes 
conversation possible, authentic or real (Rhees 2006: 33-
62).  
Certainly, Rhees claims, the unity in question cannot be 
ensured neither by formal, logical relations between sen-
tences, nor by “external relations” between expressions – 
analogical to rules that are in effect in a game. Rather, 
such a unity is secured by “internal relations of remarks 
people make to one another in a conversation” (Rhees 
2006: 161), which should be understood as “connexions of 
meaning” (ibidem) of remarks that “hang together” and 
“bear on one another” (Rhees 2006: 29). 
In another passage (essay “Signals and Saying Some-
thing”) Rhees makes one more interesting observation 
about meaning: 
Where you talk of meaning, you can talk of other 
things that might be meant or might be said. And this 
belongs to understanding, somehow. Not that you 
need think of any alternatives; generally you do not. 
But understanding what is meant, or knowing what is 
meant: if you are said to “know something” then it is 
“something” which allows for such alternatives (Rush 
2006: 100).  
Therefore, an utterance, or a sentence, means something 
only in the context of something else, namely, another 
sentence. It makes sense only in possible, alternative con-
nections with some other things that might be said. 
In addition, Rhees seems to implicitly assume that par-
ticipants in conversation have to make inferences – in re-
lating different remarks to one another, in grasping the 
consequences of particular sayings and reasons for them. 
Still, he resists speaking explicitly of inferences, presuma-
bly due to the fact that by talking of inferences he mostly 
meant only formal ones – recall that Rhees himself, after 
Wittgenstein of PI, refused the view that the unity of lan-
guage comes down to logical form of propositions and 
formal relations between them. Thus, he generally avoids 
using the term “inference”. One can justifiably assume that 
Rhees did not know, at least did not use, the terms “infor-
mal inference”, and particularly “material inference”2 – the 
latter to be the main concept of inferentialism. Yet, to re-
peat, he implicitly allowed them. For he writes (in “Wittgen-
stein’s Builders – Recapitulation”): 
If people are speaking together, then the significance 
of this or that remark is not like the significance of a 
logical conclusion. But the remarks they make have 
something to do with one another; otherwise they are 
not talking at all, even if they are uttering sentences. 
And their remarks could have no bearing on one an-
other unless the expressions they used were used in 
other connexions as well (Rhees 2006: 158). 
In view of that, supposing participants in conversation re-
lates different remarks or expressions to one another, and 
they use these expressions in connections with many 
other expressions, they simply make inferences, albeit not 
formal ones (based on logical form), but material ones – 
based only on conceptual content. 
                                                     
2 In inferentialism, it is assumed that inferences may be based only on the 
content of expressions used in discourse: e.g. from “Pittsburgh is to the west 
of Princeton” to “Princeton is to the east of Pittsburgh”, from “Lightning is seen 
now” to “Thunder will be heard soon” and plenty of others. These inferences 
are believed to be good as they stand, irrespective of the possible enthyme-
matic premises they could be supplemented with and of any logical form they 
might be afterwards arranged in (Brandom 2000: 52-55). 




To sum up, four particular views can be ascribed to 
Rhees’ philosophical stance: (1) Essentialism – the view 
that language has its essence; in Rhees such an essence 
is conversation, or discourse. While language having many 
various function, the function constitutive of it, the one 
which all other language games depend on, is conversa-
tion. (2) Propositionalism – the semantic position claiming 
that the basic items of meaning are sentences, not sub-
sentential entities (e.g. names). As the essential game is 
discourse, in which the key functions are commenting 
something, answering questions, asking questions etc., 
one can infer that the elements to play fundamental, indis-
pensible role are just sentences. (3) Semantic holism – the 
view that there are no separate and independent items of 
meaning, but, conversely, each item is tied with some 
other ones; each remark in conversation is somehow se-
mantically connected with some others. Where Rhees 
says that when making a sentence, some other possible 
alternatives are available (Rhees 2006: 100), he manifests 
a holistic stance. (4) Inferentialism – the position claiming 
that meaning is conferred on linguistic expressions on vir-
tue of their use in actual or possible inferences; and the 
inferences in question are not principally based on formal 
logical schemas, but depend primarily on the content of 
expressions deployed in them. In other words, these infer-
ences are not formal, but rather material ones. 
The four above stances are also general characteristic 
features of today’s inferentialism in the philosophy of lan-
guage as presented by Brandom (Brandom 1994, 2000). 
The conclusion that flows from the present considerations 
is that Rhees’ essentialist critique of Wittgenstein, as to the 
alleged analogy between language and games, can be 
interpreted in an inferentialist spirit. It also suggests a ten-
tative, but plausible, claim that Rhees’ agreeing on “con-
versation” to be the essence of language – along with his 
propositionalism, holism and implicitly assumed inferential-
ism – leads him inevitably to accepting Brandom’s “game 
of giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom 2000: 189-
196) as the downtown of linguistic activity. 
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